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 What is Cyberterrorism? 
Findings From a Survey of Researchers
1
 
 
 This article reports on a recent survey designed to capture understandings of cyberterrorism 
 across the global research community. Specifically, it explores competing views, and the importance 
 thereof, amongst the 118 respondents on three definitional issues: First, the need for a specific 
 definition of cyberterrorism for either policymakers or researchers; Second, the core characteristics or 
 constituent parts of this concept; and, Third, the value of applying the term cyberterrorism to a range 
 of actual or potential scenarios. The article concludes by arguing that while a majority of researchers 
 believe a specific definition of cyberterrorism necessary for academics and policymakers, 
 disagreement around what this might look like has additional potential to stimulate a rethinking of 
 terrorism more widely. 
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Introduction 
This article reports original findings from a recent project on definitions and understandings 
of the concept of ‘cyberterrorism’ within the global research community. This ‘state of the 
discipline’ exercise employed a survey which was completed by 118 researchers working in 
24 countries across six continents. The survey was designed with three principal ambitions. 
The first was to map areas of consensus, disagreement and ambiguity on core definitional 
questions around the term cyberterrorism. The second was to explore whether agreement or 
otherwise on these definitional questions had implications for derivative debates including on 
the causes and threat of cyberterrorism. The third was to map current academic activity in this 
area, including the extent to which researchers are currently teaching courses on 
cyberterrorism, or planning to do so.
2
 
 The discussion in this article focuses on findings relating to three issues of definition 
in particular. First, whether the academic community deems a specific definition of 
cyberterrorism necessary for either policymakers or researchers. Second, the core 
characteristics or constitutive elements of cyberterrorism. And, third, the appropriateness and 
value of applying the term ‘cyberterrorism’ to a range of actual and potential scenarios. By 
presenting and discussing these findings, this article aims to take stock of what is known or 
thought about cyberterrorism within the research community today. This is important, we 
argue, because the increasing prevalence of this term across political, media and academic 
debate since its coinage in the 1980s
3
 has engendered nothing like a consistency of usage. 
The academic backdrop to our exploration is a series of precedent studies that were integral 
to mapping the contours of academic research on terrorism more broadly. Schmid and 
Jongman’s pioneering Political Terrorism,4 made similar use of a questionnaire, “…mailed to 
some two hundred members of the research community in the field of political terrorism in 
1985”.5 Silke’s edited Research on Terrorism offers a related review of dominant 
methodological techniques and research trends within terrorism research.
6
 More recent still 
are contributions by Ranstorp and Silke on the interests and limitations of terrorism research 
in the post-9/11 period.
7
 Where all of these outputs helped consolidate knowledge of, and 
identify tensions within, terrorism research at particular junctures, we attempt here to do 
likewise for the concept of cyberterrorism. 
 The article proceeds in four stages. We begin with a review of current academic 
literature on the concept of cyberterrorism. Drawing attention to the diversity of definitions of 
this term we distinguish, first, between narrow and broad conceptions, and, second, between 
different approaches to the distinctiveness of cyberterrorism. The second section outlines our 
methodology, following which we turn to analysing our findings. The article concludes by 
arguing that while a majority of researchers believe a specific definition of cyberterrorism 
necessary for academics and policymakers, disagreements and debates around what this 
might look like also have potential to encourage a rethinking of terrorism more widely. 
  
Cyberterrorism: Concepts and Controversies 
The extent and the longevity of definitional debate on the concept of terrorism have been 
well-documented. Despite its far briefer existence, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
cyberterrorism presents an equally contested concept.
8
 With its emergence tied, in part, to late 
twentieth century insecurities and zeitgeists in which, “…the rapid growth in Internet use and 
the debate on the emerging “information society” sparked several studies on the potential 
risks faced by the highly networked, high-tech dependent United States”,9 the continuing 
popularity of cyberterrorism as a concept - and fear - has been underpinned by established 
economic and political interests, as much as by psychological fears of its occurrence.
10
 
Despite this continued resonance, however, two definitional issues in particular divide 
researchers working in this area. The first is referential: to what does, or should, the term 
cyberterrorism refer? The second is relational: how is cyberterrorism similar to, and different 
from, other forms of violence or behaviour? Is it, for instance, a distinctive phenomenon with 
its own characteristics? Or is it a sub-species of terrorism which comprises a broad and 
diverse spectrum of violences? 
 To begin with the former question, discussions of cyberterrorism’s appropriate 
referent frequently invoke a distinction between narrow and broad conceptions of this term. 
Where the former concentrate on terrorist attacks conducted via or against information 
infrastructures, more expansive understandings are willing to incorporate a far more diverse 
range of online activities associated with terrorism under this heading. Thus, as Brunst notes: 
  
 A more narrow view is often worded close to common terrorism definitions and might include only 
 politically motivated attacks against information systems and only if they result in violence against 
 noncombatant targets…Broader approaches often include other forms of terrorist use of the Internet 
 and therefore might define cyberterrorism as almost any use of information technology by terrorists.
11
 
 
Talihärm invokes a similar distinction, differentiating between target-oriented (narrow) and 
tool-oriented (broad) understandings:  
 
 The first identifies as cyberterrorism all politically or socially motivated attacks against computers, 
 networks and information, whether conducted through other computers or physically, when causing 
 injuries, bloodshed or serious damage, or fear (hereafter ‘target-oriented cyberterrorism’). The second 
 labels all actions using the Internet or computers to organize and complete terrorist actions as 
 cyberterrorism (hereafter ‘tool-oriented cyberterrorism’).12 
 
Under this latter approach, activities as diverse as fundraising, reconnaissance, 
communications and propagandising all potentially qualify as cyberterrorism if conducted 
online for the purposes of terrorism. 
 Perhaps the most familiar example of a narrower approach is found within Dorothy 
Denning’s 2000 Testimony before the US House of Representatives. As the following 
demonstrates, the remit of her definition is circumscribed in two unrelated ways. 
 
 Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. It is generally understood to mean 
 unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein 
 when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or 
 social objectives. Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence against 
 persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily 
 injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe economic loss would be examples. 
 Serious attacks against critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their 
 impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not.
13
 
 
The first restriction introduced by Denning is a focus on information technologies as the 
immediate target of an attack. As her subsequent elaboration makes clear, these technologies 
serve also as the instruments of cyberterrorism: 
 
Cyber spies, thieves, saboteurs, and thrill seekers break into computer systems, steal personal data and 
trade secrets, vandalize Web sites, disrupt service, sabotage data and systems, launch computer viruses 
and worms, conduct fraudulent transactions, and harass individuals and companies. These attacks are 
facilitated with increasingly powerful and easy-to-use software tools, which are readily available for 
free from thousands of Web sites on the Internet.
14
 
 
Second, Denning’s account also includes the condition of material or corporeal harm. To 
qualify as cyberterrorism, in this understanding, an attack must have offline or ‘real world’ 
consequences that extend beyond damage to information technologies or data.  
 Narrow understandings of cyberterrorism such as Denning’s remain far more 
prevalent in the literature than their more expansive counterparts. Weimann, for example, 
limits the term to “the use of computer network tools to harm or shut down critical national 
infrastructures (such as energy, transportation, government operations)”.15 Hua and Bapna 
define the term similarly, as, “an activity implemented by computer, network, Internet, and IT 
intended to interfere with the political, social, or economic functioning of a group, 
organization, or country; or to induce physical violence or fear; motivated by traditional 
terrorism ideologies.”16 Conway follows each of Denning’s requirements by distinguishing 
cyberterrorism from terrorist usage of computers, and by introducing a requirement that 
offline damage is caused.
17
 An early contribution by Pollitt, moreover, added a further actor-
specific qualification: “Cyberterrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated attack 
against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence 
against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents.”18 In his view, 
“For cyberterrorism to have any meaning, we must be able to differentiate it from other kinds 
of computer abuse such as computer crime, economic espionage, or information warfare.”19 
Discussions of the utility of broader understandings of cyberterrorism, on the other hand, 
include Gordon and Ford’s exploration of the Internet’s penetration into all aspects of ‘the 
terrorism matrix’.20 In their view, the dominant focus on ‘pure cyberterrorism’ (terrorist 
activities carried out entirely or primarily in the virtual world) is a potentially costly one 
given the potential of this to obscure other terrorism-related online activities. 
 If denotative breadth offers one major source of definitional disagreement, a second 
revolves around divergent views on the relationship between cyberterrorism and other types 
of terrorist activity. At least four different views are apparent here. The first is to approach 
cyberterrorism as an unlikely or purely hypothetical counterpart to the reality of other, more 
conventional, types of terrorism. Here, specificity in defining the former is important only for 
focusing the attention of analysts upon the latter more pressing concerns. Consider, for 
example, James A. Lewis’ argument: 
 
Explosions are dramatic, strike fear into the hearts of opponents and do lasting damage. Cyber attacks 
would not have the same dramatic and political effect that terrorists seek. A cyber attack, which might 
not even be noticed by its victims, or attributed to routine delays or outages, will not be their preferred 
weapon.
21
 
 
Similarly, Maura Conway advances three arguments for why, “no act of cyberterrorism has 
ever yet occurred and is unlikely to at any time in the near future”.22 These are that: terrorists 
lack technical capability and are unlikely to outsource; cyberattacks are unlikely to produce 
easily captured, spectacular (live, moving) images; and, the possibility that an attack may be 
apprehended or portrayed as an accident. On this perspective, exemplified by Joshua Green in 
the following, since cyberterrorism has never occurred, and remains unlikely to do so, it 
simply does not exist: 
 
There's just one problem: There is no such thing as cyberterrorism – no instance of anyone ever having 
been killed by a terrorist (or anyone else) using a computer. Nor is there compelling evidence that al 
Qaeda or any other terrorist organization has resorted to computers for any sort of serious destructive 
activity … Which is not to say that cybersecurity isn't a serious problem – it's just not one that involves 
terrorists.
23
 
 
As this illustrates, commentators that have taken this approach tend toward narrow 
understandings of cyberterrorism. Their rationale for engaging in questions of definition is to 
divert attention away from cyberterrorism - understood restrictively - and toward other types 
of terrorism, or other terrorist uses of the Internet. Although alternative online terrorist 
activities are potentially prevalent, they have – according to this view - “been largely ignored 
… in favour of the more headline-grabbing ‘cyberterrorism’”.24 Thus, as Denning warns, 
“Too much emphasis on cyberterror, especially if it is not a serious threat, could detract from 
other counterterrorist efforts in the cyber domain”.25 
A second view treats cyberterrorism as a reality, but one that is distinct from other 
forms of terrorism and therefore requiring of its own definition. Thomas J. Holt has argued 
that: 
  
while there is no single agreed upon definition for cyberterror, it is clear that this term must encapsulate 
a greater range of behavior than physical terror due to the dichotomous nature of cyberspace as a 
vehicle for communications as well as a medium for attacks. More expansive definitions … provide a 
much more comprehensive framework for exploring the ways that extremist groups utilize technology 
in support of their various agendas
26
 
 
This approach is similar to the first in that it emphasises terrorist uses of the Internet other 
than cyberattacks. Unlike the previous view, however, it embraces a broader definition of 
cyberterrorism which allows the identification of qualitative differences to traditional 
understandings of terrorism. For example, Holt illustrates his argument using a definition 
offered by Bryan Foltz.
27
 Whilst Foltz’s definition includes some features commonly 
associated with traditional terrorism – a political motivation and an attack (or threat of attack) 
– it does not require physical harm or an intention to generate fear. According to Foltz, 
attacks may qualify as cyberterrorist without meeting these criteria if they are intended to, 
“interfere with the political, social or economic functioning of a group, organization or 
country”, or to, “induce either physical violence or the unjust use of power”. Holt explains 
that these differences recognise the fact that “extremist groups utilize the Internet in ways that 
more closely resemble the characteristics of cybercrimes including the dissemination of 
information to incite violence and harm”.28 
 A third view collapses any qualitative distinction between cyberterrorism and more 
traditional forms of terrorism. It regards cyberterrorism simply as a subset of this broader 
category, and so states that an attack only qualifies as cyberterrorist if all components of the 
definition of terrorism have been satisfied. Michael Stohl, for example, has argued that we 
should, “restrict cyber terrorism to activities which in addition to their cyber component have 
the commonly agreed upon components of terrorism”.29 This, he explains, preserves the 
distinction between cybercrime and cyberterrorism. On this approach (exemplified also by 
Pollitt’s definition quoted above) for an attack to qualify as cyberterrorist it must result in 
violence (or the threat thereof). So if an extremist group were to interfere with the a nation’s 
Stock Exchange via digital technologies and cause severe economic damage this would not 
constitute cyberterrorism. In contrast, if the same group interfered with an air traffic control 
system and caused two passenger aircraft to collide in mid-air this would. As Collin 
succinctly puts it, cyberterrorism is “hacking with a body count”.30 From this, it follows that a 
definition of cyberterrorism is not strictly necessary. Cyberterrorist attacks already fall within 
the definition of terrorism, and the cyber prefix denotes nothing more than the means 
employed. We do not specify the means used in other forms of terrorism (no-one employs 
such terms as pyro-terrorism, aero-terrorism or hydro-terrorism), and so there is no need for a 
separate subcategory of cyberterrorism. As Gordon and Ford explain: 
 
We do not use the term ‘ice pick terrorism’ to define bombings of ice-pick factories, nor would we use 
it to define terrorism carried out with ice picks. Thus, we question the use of the term cyberterrorism to 
describe just any sort of threat or crime carried out with or against computers in general.
31
 
  
A fourth view is an amalgam of the second and third. This insists that cyberterrorism is a 
subset of the broader category of terrorism, but that there are important qualitative differences 
between the two. An example is Dorothy Denning’s 2007 definition of cyberterrorism: 
 
Cyberterrorism is generally understood to refer to highly damaging computer-based attacks or threats 
of attack by non-state actors against information systems when conducted to intimidate or coerce 
governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are political or social. It is the convergence of 
terrorism with cyberspace, where cyberspace becomes the means of conducting the terrorist act. Rather 
than committing acts of violence against persons or physical property, the cyberterrorist commits acts 
of destruction and disruption against digital property
32
 
 
In contrast to the third approach, Denning goes on to explain that an attack against critical 
infrastructure which is motivated by political or social objectives and which causes a billion 
dollar banking loss would constitute cyberterrorism. This is also the approach taken by the 
UK’s statutory definition of cyberterrorism.33 An attack qualifies as terrorist under section 1 
of the Terrorism Act 2000 if: (1) it was carried out with an intention to influence the 
government or an international governmental organisation or intimidate the public or a 
section of the public; (2) the purpose was to advance a political, religious, racial or 
ideological cause; and (3) the attack falls within one of the five actions listed in subsection 
(2). Paragraphs (a)-(d) of subsection (2) focus on acts which endanger life, cause serious 
violence or serious property damage or create a serious risk to public health and safety. By 
contrast, paragraph (e) applies whether or not human life or property was endangered. It 
encompasses acts which are designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an 
electronic system. This would include cyber-attacks on Internet service providers, financial 
exchanges computer systems and controls of national power and water.
34
 In other words, 
there exists a lower threshold for including cyber-attacks within the broad category of 
terrorism than there does for non-cyber-attacks. 
  
Methodology 
As the above discussion suggests, the concept of cyberterrorism provokes considerable 
definitional disagreement. Our own effort to contribute to these discussions involved the 
distribution of a survey to over six hundred members of the global research community 
between June and November 2012. Respondents were identified using a purposive strategy 
that made use of four primary sampling methods. First: a targeted literature review search to 
identify researchers who have published specifically on cyberterrorism within peer-reviewed 
journals, monographs, edited books, or other literature. This was completed using the main 
catalogue of the British Library and a total of 47 other online databases (including JSTOR, 
Oxford Journals online, SAGE journals online, Wiley Interscience, Springer Link, IEEE 
Xplore, Lecture Notes in Computer Science and Zetoc).
35
 The search was limited to 
publications on or since 1
 
January 2004. 
The second strategy was to target active researchers within the terrorism research 
community more widely. Whilst these individuals may not have published on cyberterrorism 
specifically, their knowledge of definitional and related debates around terrorism more 
widely meant they would be well-positioned to contribute to this research. To this end, 
individuals that had published an article in any of the following four journals since January 
1
st
 2009 were added to the sample: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Critical Studies on Terrorism, and, Perspectives on Terrorism. Members of the 
editorial boards of these journals (as of August 1
st
 2012) were also added for their academic 
standing in terrorism research. The first two journals selected - Terrorism and Political 
Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism - are widely recognised as the most 
established outlets for publishing peer-reviewed research on terrorist violence. As Andrew 
Silke argued in 2004, “Taken together - and bearing in mind their different publishers, 
separate editorial teams and largely separate editorial boards (though there is some overlap on 
this last) - the two journals can be regarded as providing a reasonably balanced impression of 
research activity in the field”.36 The continuing reputation of these journals today is 
confirmed by measures such as impact factor counts.
37
 At the same time, however, the field 
of terrorism research has expanded dramatically in recent years, becoming far more contested 
in the process.
38
 To take account of this, and to capture the plurality of contemporary 
approaches to terrorism, contributors to, and editors of, Critical Studies on Terrorism and the 
online, open access, Perspectives on Terrorism were added to our sample. 
 The third sampling strategy was a ‘snowball method’ in which we contacted potential 
respondents identified by individuals who had already completed the survey. The fourth was 
via two academic mailing lists maintained by the Terrorism and Political Violence 
Association,
39
 and the British International Studies Association Critical Terrorism Studies 
Working Group.
40
 Although there was, of course, overlap in the individuals identified in our 
four strategies, these latter two methods engendered far fewer respondents than did our initial 
literature review searches. 
 The use of a purposive, non-probabilistic, sampling strategy was, we argue, 
appropriate to the survey’s ambitions.41 Whilst it involves sacrificing any strict claim to 
statistical representativeness, this may be defended given the nature of the population in 
whom we were interested: the terrorism research community. Where the boundaries of this 
community lie, and who may be considered a legitimate inhabitant therein, are, of course 
eminently contestable. Does it, for instance, extend to research students, non-affiliated 
researchers, or retired academics? Moreover, as with any epistemic community - indeed, 
perhaps more than many
42
 - the field of terrorism research is, by its nature, fluid and porous. 
Individuals enter and leave this community according to their evolving research interests, and 
any effort to capture opinion therein can offer only a de-temporalised snapshot of a dynamic 
phenomenon. In this sense, this sacrifice of representativeness is justified given the lack of 
any objectively identifiable population here. 
 A total of 118 responses from researchers working in 24 countries across six 
continents were generated by our survey. Of the 117 responses providing geographical 
information, our sample had a majority of respondents working in the United States of 
America and United Kingdom: 41 (35% of the total) and 32 (27%) respectively. The next 
largest sites were Australia (7 respondents, 6%) and Canada (4 respondents, 3%). This 
weighting toward anglophonic countries is unfortunate, but unsurprising given the traditional 
anglocentricism of terrorism research.
43
 In terms of professional status, the distribution was 
as follows: Academic Staff (Permanent): 75 (64%); Academic Staff (Temporary): 16 (14%); 
Research Student: 9 (8%); Independent Researcher: 11 (9%); Retired: 2 (2%); and, None of 
the Above: 5(4%). In terms of disciplinary background, finally, our sample described 
themselves thus: Political Science/International Relations: 69 (50%); 
Psychology/Anthropology: 20 (15%); Engineering/Computer Science/Cyber 17(12%); 
Law/Criminology: 15 (11%); Literature/Arts/History: 9 (7%); Independent 
Researchers/Analysts: 5 (4%); and, Economics/Business: 2 (1%).
44
 This high proportion of 
researchers identifying with the disciplines of Political Science and International Relations 
again resonates with earlier empirical studies of terrorism research.
45
 
 Our survey employed a combination of open-ended and closed questions designed to 
generate quantitative and qualitative data. Twenty questions were included in total. These 
focused on: demographic information; definitional issues around terrorism and 
cyberterrorism; the cyberterrorism threat; countering cyberterrorism; and, views of current 
research on this phenomenon, including the major challenges facing contemporary scholars. 
To encourage as high a completion rate as possible, the questionnaire was made available via 
an online survey and a word processing document.  
 
Findings and Analysis 
The remainder of our article explores our research findings in relation to six questions from 
our survey:
46
 
 
 Question 2: On a scale of 1 to 5 - where 1 is ‘not at all’ and 5 is ‘entirely’ - to what 
extent have the definitional issues around terrorism in general been satisfactorily 
resolved: a) For policymakers; b) For researchers? 
 Question 3: On a scale of 1 to 5 - where 1 is ‘not at all’ and 5 is ‘very important’ - 
how important is/was their resolution: a) For policymakers; b) For researchers? 
 Question 4: On a scale of 1 to 5 - where 1 is ‘of no use’ and 5 is ‘essential’ - how 
necessary do you believe a specific definition of cyberterrorism to be: a) For 
policymakers; b) For researchers? 
 Question 5: In your view, which of these are important elements of cyberterrorism?: 
A political or ideological motive; Civilian targets; Criminality or illegality; Fear as an 
outcome; Random or indiscriminate attack; A theatrical or performative dimension; 
Conducted by an organization or group; Digital means or target; Non-state 
perpetrators; Violence against people or property. 
 Question 6: In your view are there any important elements of cyberterrorism missing 
from this list [above]? 
 Question 7: The following diagram distinguishes terrorist acts by the site of their 
preparation, means and target. In your view, which of the following scenarios 
constitutes an act of cyberterrorism?
47
 
 
Defining (Cyber)terrorism 
One of the main aims of our survey was to explore whether the ‘cyber’ prefix has any 
discernible impact on definitional issues around the wider concept of terrorism. In other 
words, do views of the necessity - or existence - of an adequate definition of ‘cyberterrorism’ 
simply reproduce researcher stances on definitional debates in this area more generally? Or, 
alternatively, does a shift in focus from terrorism to cyberterrorism lead to a shift in 
perspective on the value of definitional work? To explore this, we began our survey by 
seeking respondents’ views on two related themes: (i) The importance of resolving the 
definitional issues around terrorism in general, and, (ii) Whether these issues have already 
been satisfactorily resolved. Respondents were provided with a five point Likert scale to 
record their answers for policymakers and researchers, with an optional free text box for 
further reflection. Tables 1 and 2 summarise the response to these questions: 
 
 
{Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here} 
 
 
As Table 1 demonstrates, the definitional issues surrounding terrorism have not been 
satisfactorily resolved for many respondents to our survey. In relation to policymakers, the 
mean score was 2.41. For researchers, it was slightly higher, at 2.82. Just over one-third of 
respondents (34%) entered a score of either 1 or 2 in respect of researchers, rising to just over 
one half (52%) for policymakers. Importantly, as Table 2 illustrates, the majority of 
respondents also believe that the resolution of these definitional issues has importance. A 
majority of all respondents entered a score of either 4 or 5 for policymakers (61%) and 
researchers (57%) alike; the mean scores being 3.71 (policymakers) and 3.61 (researchers). 
 A number of respondents explained why they believe a satisfactory definition of 
terrorism is important. Some emphasised the importance of clarity for researchers for setting 
the parameters of a research project (R29), communicating findings to others (R87), and in 
ensuring consistency across different projects (for example, in databases of terrorist events) 
(R87). Others focussed on the implementation of policy and legislation. They explained that a 
clear definition of terrorism is needed to delineate the scope of terrorism-related criminal 
offences (R33), to distinguish terrorism from crime (R70), and to facilitate cooperation across 
jurisdictional boundaries (R1). As one respondent suggested: “If we do not know exactly 
what terrorism is, how can we study or stop it?” (R80). 
 Whilst the majority of respondents approached terrorism’s definitional issues as both 
important and unsatisfactorily resolved, it is important to note that this view was far from 
unanimous. In Table 2, roughly one-fifth of respondents entered a score of either 1 or 2 out of 
5 on the importance of a definition of terrorism (20% in respect of researchers, 18% in 
respect of policymakers). A similar number also felt that the definitional issues had already 
been satisfactorily resolved. In Table 1, 19 respondents (17%) entered a score of either 4 or 5 
in respect of policymakers. This figure rose to 30 respondents (25%) in respect of 
researchers. 
 As Table 3 demonstrates, a related trend was apparent in responses to question 4, 
which sought respondents’ views on the necessity of a specific definition of cyberterrorism. 
 
 
{Insert Table 3 here} 
 
 
Here, the majority of our respondents believed a specific definition of cyberterrorism to be 
necessary for each audience: policymakers and researchers. The mean scores for this question 
were 3.73 (for policymakers) and 3.51 (for researchers). Almost two-thirds of respondents 
entered a score of either 4 or 5 in respect of policymakers (66%) and although the total was 
slightly lower in respect of researchers it was still a majority (56%). Roughly one-fifth 
doubted the necessity of such an enterprise, entering a score of either 1 or 2 (18% in respect 
of policymakers, 23% in respect of researchers). 
 Justifications for, and objections to, a specific definition of cyberterrorism largely 
mirrored those given for terrorism more broadly. One respondent pointed out that 
jurisdictional problems are likely to be especially acute in cases involving cyberterrorism, 
increasing the importance of a clear definition here (R1). Others, in contrast, questioned the 
value of definitional work at all: 
 
 Security practice does not require definition of threat. It is performative – it constructs its own threats 
 and its reasons for being. Cyberterrorism, or ‘terrorism’, performs an oppositional construct that 
 doesn’t require specific definition (R36) 
 Others still argued that, since the cyber realm is relatively young and rapidly developing, it 
would be premature and counterproductive to attempt to define cyberterrorism. One 
respondent, for example, argued, “rigid definitions fix artificial meanings on social 
phenomena that are perennially shifting, thus foreclosing certain parameters for adaptation of 
‘new’ or ‘alternative’ conceptions of cyberterrorism” (R45). In the words of another: “cyber 
is in a state of flux at the moment, so some uncertainty is helpful. We don't know what a 
cyber world looks like, so defining terrorism within that context is a bit early” (R20). 
 There were also contrasting views on the relative importance to policymakers and 
researchers of resolving these issues. As Chart 1 illustrates, the overall view was that not only 
are these definitional issues more important for policymakers than for researchers, but also 
that they have been less satisfactorily resolved for the former: 
 
 
{Insert Chart 1 here} 
 
 
A number of reasons were provided for the greater importance of definitional issues to 
policymakers. Some focussed on the formulation of laws and policies, and the prior need to 
identify the targeted phenomenon (R43, R54). Others focussed on the application of laws and 
policies and the need to stop the misapplication (R46, R72, R82, R104) or deliberate misuse 
(R101) of statutory or other powers. At the same time, as Chart 2 demonstrates, 27 
respondents (25%) believed the resolution of terrorism’s definitional issues to be of greater 
significance to researchers. As one respondent put it: 
  
 Having worked in a policy-making environment as well as an academic one on this issue, it seems to 
 me that policymakers' definitions of such phenomena tend to flow from legislative sources and are 
 significant only inasmuch as they affect decisions about prosecutions (i.e. who should be charged with 
 'terrorist' hacking vs. computer mischief) or jurisdiction (i.e. an incident is a law enforcement problem 
 or an intelligence service problem). They are far more problematic and vital for researchers, who wish 
 to understand the phenomena in question in objective, holistic terms (R21) 
 
 
{Insert Chart 2 here} 
 
 
It is also worth noting that, when the question focussed on cyberterrorism specifically, rather 
than terrorism in general, the number of respondents entering a higher score for policymakers 
increased to 36 respondents (32%) from 31 respondents (28%). At the same time, the number 
entering a higher score for researchers decreased from 27 respondents (25%) to 22 
respondents (20%). Coupled with the mean scores from chart 1, this clearly suggests that the 
definitional issues surrounding terrorism in general are of greater importance to researchers 
than the ones surrounding cyberterrorism, as viewed by our respondents. 
 Finally, on this theme, Table 4 presents respondents’ answers to these questions by 
disciplinary background. Several respondents’ additional comments emphasised the especial 
importance of definitions in the legal realm, offering statements such as, “Definitions matter 
most with respect to law” (R67) and “A specific definition would be most useful for 
lawmakers” (R99). It is striking, therefore, that when asked how important the definitional 
issues around terrorism are for policymakers the mean score for the respondents from Group 
B of our sample - Law, Criminology, et al - was lower than for any of the other six groups: 
 
 {Insert Table 4 here} 
 
Understanding Cyberterrorism 
Question 5 of our survey asked respondents to identify important elements of cyberterrorism 
from a list of ten items drawn from the literature reviewed in the above section. 115 
respondents in total answered this question (response rate: 97%). As Chart 3 illustrates, the 
three features regarded as the most important were: (i) motive; (ii) digital means or target; 
and, (iii) fear as an outcome. Given the survey’s focus on cyberterrorism, it is interesting to 
note that a greater number of respondents selected the need for a political or ideological 
motive than a digital means or target. The fact that fewer than half of our respondents 
selected violence against people or property is also noteworthy, not least for its contrast to 
Schmid and Jongman’s review of definitions of terrorism which identified ‘violence, force’ 
as the most prevalent of word categories, appearing in 83.5% of the definitions discussed.
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{Insert Chart 3 here} 
 
Question 6 then asked respondents to identify important elements of cyberterrorism missing 
from our list, with 50 respondents replying with one or more suggestions (see Table 5). The 
most common response was harm or disruption to infrastructure. One respondent, for 
example, commented that cyberterrorism is “about the disruption of ICT systems. The effects 
will spill over to non-digital social processes, but the immediate target is something digital” 
(R63). The next two most common responses were the possibility of state perpetration, and 
coercion or terror in a wider audience. 
 {Insert Table 5 here} 
 
To generate a fuller understanding of the applicability of the label cyberterrorism to particular 
activities, Question 7 of the survey provided a tree diagram reproduced in Chart 4 below. 
This derived from Devost et al’s suggestion that “pure” information terrorism (which 
involves digital tools and a digital target) may be distinguished from information terrorism 
(which involves either digital tools or a digital target, but not both).
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 The tree diagram set out 
a total of eight scenarios - or types of event - involving different combinations of 
digital/physical preparation, means and targets. Respondents were asked to decide which 
scenarios would constitute acts of cyberterrorism. The three possible answers were: yes; 
potentially; or, no. Respondents were also able to enter additional comments in a free text 
box.  
 Nine respondents stated in the text box that the diagram was unclear or lacked 
sufficient explanation. To an extent, this was a product of our decision not to provide further 
clarification or examples in an effort to avoid leading respondents. One of the other most 
common concerns was the diagram’s lack of reference to a protagonist’s motives. This query 
appeared to be based on a misunderstanding of the difference between necessary and 
sufficient conditions. The aim of the question was to ascertain respondents’ views on whether 
digital preparation, means and target are necessary conditions for an attack to be classified as 
cyberterrorism, not whether they are sufficient conditions. The claim that digital preparation, 
means and/or target are necessary conditions does not automatically entail the claim that they 
are also sufficient. So any reference to the motives of the attacker was unnecessary, just as it 
is possible to state that a dead body is a necessary prerequisite for a murder conviction 
without knowing anything about the intentions of the attacker. 
 In total, 92 respondents completed this question in full (response rate: 80%). A further 
13 completed it in part. The figures in each row of Chart 4 are the proportion of respondents 
who responded to that particular scenario. The data suggests, first, that digital preparatory 
activities were generally regarded as insufficient for an attack to qualify as cyberterrorism. 
Whilst 61% of respondents stated that scenario D – which involved digital preparation but 
physical means and target – did not constitute cyberterrorism, only 20% stated that it did. So, 
whilst some researchers might classify an attack such as 9/11 as cyberterrorism on the basis 
that the Internet was used for planning and to purchase tickets,
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 it seems the majority would 
not. 
 
{Insert Chart 4 here} 
 
 
As Chart 4 indicates, the means and target of an attack were of far greater significance to our 
respondents than its preparation. Of these, digital means were regarded as the most important. 
On scenario F, in which the only digital component was the means employed, 38% of 
respondents believed this constituted cyberterrorism, with only 18% selecting no. By 
contrast, in response to scenario G – where the only digital component was the target – 33% 
stated this did constitute cyberterrorism with 32% claiming not. A similar comparison can be 
drawn between scenarios C (where the only physical component was the means employed) 
and B (where the only physical component was the target). In the absence of a digital target, 
60% of respondents believed that the scenario nonetheless constituted cyberterrorism. This 
figure fell to 50% when it was digital means that were missing. Similarly, in the absence of a 
digital target only 10% of respondents stated that the scenario did not constitute 
cyberterrorism. This figure rose to 27% when it was digital means that were absent. 
 Although, as the responses to questions 5 and 7 indicate, the majority of respondents 
regarded digital means or target as an important element of cyberterrorism, this view was not 
unanimous. As shown in Chart 3 above, 23% of respondents did not select digital means or 
target as important elements of cyberterrorism. In Table 6, we therefore set out the responses 
to our tree diagram divided into two parts: the responses from those who did select digital 
means or target and, the responses from those who did not. The figures in brackets are the 
difference from the percentage figure for all respondents (set out in chart 4 above). As one 
would expect, those who did not select digital means or target in question 5 were less likely 
to state that the scenarios involving physical means do not constitute cyberterrorism. In this 
group’s responses to each of the four scenarios involving physical means (C, D, G and H) the 
proportion that selected no was significantly lower than the equivalent figure for those that 
had selected digital means or target in question 5. The same was not true, however, for the 
four scenarios involving a physical target (B, D, F and H). Perhaps surprisingly, for two of 
these scenarios (B and F) a greater proportion of those that had not selected digital means or 
target as an important element of cyberterrorism said that these scenarios do not constitute 
cyberterrorism. This again suggests that, for those who regarded digital means or target as an 
important element of cyberterrorism, it is digital means that is the most important. 
 
 
{Insert Table 6 here} 
 
Table 7 focuses on another divisive issue: the relevance of violence against people or 
property. We saw above that in question 5, 47% of respondents selected this as an important 
element of cyberterrorism. Table 7 breaks down the responses to question 7 into two 
categories: the responses from those that selected violence against people or property in 
question 5; and, the responses from those that did not. 
 
 
{Insert Table 7 here} 
  
 
Table 7 shows that those respondents that did select violence against people or property in 
question 5 were more likely to opine that scenarios involving a physical target were 
cyberterrorism. The proportion of this group that stated that the four scenarios involving a 
physical target (B, D, F and H) constitute cyberterrorism was significantly higher than the 
equivalent figure for the group that did not select violence against people or property in 
question 5. As one respondent explained, if violence against people or property is an 
important element of a cyberterrorist attack it follows that the target of the attack is physical: 
 
 The question of how you define the target is very important. If a terrorist group attacks an ICT system 
 (digital) that controls people’s drinking water supply (physical), the immediate target is digital, but the 
 goal of the attack is to harm people physically. In my view, disrupting an ICT system is rarely, if ever, 
 a goal in itself in a cyber terrorist attack (R63) 
 
This is further supported by the fact that the group who selected violence against people or 
property in question 5 were significantly less likely to state that scenarios D and H (which 
involved physical means and a physical target) did not constitute cyberterrorism. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This article has explored a diversity of views amongst the terrorism research community on a 
number of fundamental conceptual and definitional questions around cyberterrorism. These 
include: whether the definitional issues surrounding terrorism in general have been 
satisfactorily resolved; how important it is to resolve these definitional issues; whether a 
specific definition of cyberterrorism is necessary; whether the resolution of these definitional 
issues is more important for researchers or policymakers; which constitute the most important 
elements in identifying cyberterrorism; and, the relative importance of digital preparation, 
means and target in identifying whether an attack may be described as cyberterrorism. Whilst 
our findings did not reveal unanimity or consensus on any of these issues, in some cases it 
was possible to identify dominant views. Specifically, as demonstrated above, the majority of 
respondents to our survey argued that: the definitional issues surrounding terrorism in general 
are important but have not been satisfactorily resolved for either policymakers or researchers; 
a specific definition of cyberterrorism is needed by both policymakers and researchers; 
political/ideological motives, digital means/targets and the production of fear constitute 
important elements of cyberterrorism; and, digital means is more important than digital target 
or digital preparation in identifying whether an attack may be described as cyberterrorism. 
The fact that a majority of respondents believed that a definition of cyberterrorism is needed 
is in keeping with the existing literature on the concept reviewed at this article’s outset. For, 
as explained previously, even those arguing that cyberterrorism does not exist have tended to 
engage in, and urged the importance of, these definitional questions. 
Our findings also demonstrate researchers’ different views on the referential and 
relational questions that were highlighted in our literature review. In terms of the referential 
question – to what does, or should, the term cyberterrorism refer? – contrasting conceptions 
of cyberterrorism were particularly apparent in the responses to question 7. Whilst some 
respondents adopted a broad understanding of the term (with, for example, 20% stating that a 
scenario involving digital preparation but physical means and target constitutes 
cyberterrorism), many others applied a far narrower understanding emphasising the 
importance of using digital means to launch an attack. 
In terms of the relational question – is cyberterrorism a distinctive phenomenon with 
its own characteristics, or a sub-species of terrorism as a broad and diverse category of 
violence? – different approaches were also identifiable. Some of our respondents appeared to 
regard cyberterrorism as a subset of terrorism, with an attack only qualifying as cyberterrorist 
once all of the components of the definition of terrorism had been properly satisfied. These 
respondents therefore regarded physical violence against people or property as an important 
element of cyberterrorism. Importantly, however, this was not a majority view. That there is, 
as such, a contrast here with understandings of terrorism per se raises the question of whether 
there exist qualitative differences between terrorism and cyberterrorism. In his discussion of 
state terrorism, Andrew Silke suggested: “I cannot help but feel that state terrorism is actually 
a rhinoceros which has strayed close to our terrorism elephant. So while there are similarities 
between the two, they are ultimately two different creatures”.51 Our findings suggest that, for 
many researchers, whilst terrorism and cyberterrorism share some common features, they 
might ultimately also be different creatures. 
It is highly significant, then, that several national legislatures (including the UK) have 
adopted the fourth of the approaches to the relational question explored at this article’s outset. 
This view treats cyberterrorism as a subset of the broader category of terrorism, but 
simultaneously recognises that there are qualitative differences between the two. Adding a 
qualitatively distinct subcategory to an already existing concept has the potential to have 
important knock-on effects. For, as Collier and Mahon explain, “when scholars take a 
category developed from one set of cases and extend it to additional cases, the new cases may 
be sufficiently different that the category is no longer appropriate in its additional form.”52 In 
this sense, our findings suggest that disagreement over the concept of cyberterrorism is 
important not only in assessing and responding to this particular threat. But, in addition, 
because this disagreement also encourages scholars to reconsider, perhaps even change, their 
understandings of terrorism itself. 
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